

Legitimizing effects of extreme party entrance: The Case of the German AfD

6th August 2019

Abstract

While a rich amount of research analyzes who votes for radical right parties and why, the consequences of radical party entrance for politics and societies are less well understood. One potential consequence of the breakthrough of radical parties is that their success further legitimizes these parties and their stances. We test for the legitimization effect of parliamentary entrance using the case of the election of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) into thirteen regional parliaments between 2013 and 2017. Using two-way fixed effects regressions on individual-level panel data, we find that entering the regional parliament increases party identification with the AfD and shifts public priorities towards those of the party. Our results improve our understanding of the rise of radical ideologies and parties in contemporary democracies.

1 Introduction

Challenges to liberal democracies often come from within, for example when their citizens choose to vote in large numbers for illiberal, anti-democratic candidates and parties. The presence of these parties in the democratic arena can have long-lasting, fundamental effects on political competition. Once endowed with parliamentary representation, these parties can achieve further success by leveraging the attention and resources this brings (Dinas, Riera, and Roussias 2015). Moreover, simply being present in political institutions may legitimize radical stances and thus shift the boundaries of public discourse (Bischof and Wagner 2019; Valentim 2019). In this paper, we test whether such electoral success can persuade further citizens to support radical politicians.

Electoral success and parliamentary representation can legitimize and strengthen radical stances. There are several reasons for this. First, elections transmit information about attitudes and social norms to voters (Tankard and Paluck 2016; Bursztyn and Fiorin 2017; Tankard and Paluck 2017). When radical politicians and parties gain significant electoral support, this may tell voters that certain views, previously considered marginal and out-of-bounds, have more support than they thought. Such voters realize that they are not isolated, but can rather count on a broader community of like-minded citizens.

Second, the effects of ‘momentum’, the advantage that accrues to candidates or parties seen as gaining support (Mutz 1997), mean that party success leads voters to place greater weight on its views and take its ideas more seriously. Electoral success may thus lead citizens to ‘engage in process of self-persuasion’ (Mutz 1997: p.195), whereby they take arguments seriously that otherwise would not have been considered. In the case of radical parties, electoral success may lead voters to take these parties seriously and consider their political programme and personnel.

Finally, elite polarization has been shown to foster equivalent attitude change among citizens (Hetherington 2001; Druckman, Peterson, and Slothuus 2013; Castanho Silva 2017). When radical parties are electorally successful, elite polarization is a likely (and almost inherent) consequence, which in turn should lead to voter polarization as well.

In this paper, we examine the legitimizing effect of party entrance into parliament. This

clear, binary signal that a party is successful provides new, radical competitors with instant institutional recognition and legitimation. Hence, this event is likely to generate headlines and grab the attention of voters. Here, we examine the rise of the radical-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) between 2013 and 2017, a period in which the party gained gradual representation in regional parliaments. The party's success was a major change in Germany's political landscape, which previously had been characterized by a strong taboo and a lack of success for such movements (van Spanje and Weber 2017). We use the party's gradual entrance into regional parliaments to test whether legitimization occurred more in those regions where the party had gained parliamentary representation. Our results show that regions where the AfD had entered the regional parliament exhibit greater party identification with that party and more concern with migration, the AfD's key topic at the time.

While evidence for the polarizing effect of extreme party entrance into parliament has been found in Bischof and Wagner (2019), we therefore extend their findings in three ways: first, the rise of the AfD is an important test case for the legitimization-through-elections hypothesis, as it is one of the few cases where party entrance occurred gradually; second, examining the rise of one party in one country allows us to hold constant many context-specific factors; and third, we examine party identification and issue salience rather than left-right polarization, thus generalizing the legitimizing effect of extreme party entrance. Our results have implications for our understanding of how radical stances gain acceptance in liberal democracies.

2 The case of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)

The AfD was founded in April 2013 in opposition to the Euro (Schmitt-Beck 2017; Goerres, Spies, and Kumlin 2018). Initially the party and its supporters could best be described as Euro-sceptic and neoliberal with nationalist tendencies (Arzheimer 2015; Berbuir, Lewandowsky, and Siri 2015; Schmitt-Beck 2017). Yet, even then the party was also attractive to voters with immigration-sceptic views more characteristic of radical-right supporters (Schmitt-Beck 2017).

By 2015, immigration had become the AfD's main issue. This change occurred in particular after the radical-right, anti-migration wing within the party took control (Goerres, Spies, and Kumlin 2018). From then on, the party can be classified as a populist radical right party due to

2 *The case of the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)*

its anti-elite, anti-immigration platform (Schmitt-Beck 2017; Goerres, Spies, and Kumlin 2018; Hansen and Olsen 2019), while its voters also became more xenophobic rather than Eurosceptic (Schmitt-Beck 2017).

The AfD is an ideal case to test for legitimization effects for three reasons. First, the party and its positions were widely seen as socially undesirable and could thus potentially be legitimized by party success. For instance, vote intention for the AfD was initially often underreported (Lehrer, Juhl, and Gschwend 2019). Social opprobrium associated with AfD support is perhaps due to long-term mainstream party efforts to de-legitimise radical parties in post-WWII Germany (Van Spanje and Van Der Brug 2007). The AfD is the first party to break that barrier and become a radical-right party with sustained success. Given that radical-right parties are established parties in most other European contexts, the rise of the AfD provides a recent case of over-time legitimization.

Second, we can test for the effect of party entrance because it gained parliamentary representation gradually across German regions (see Appendix Table A.1). In 2013, the AfD had narrowly failed to pass the 5 % electoral threshold to gain seats in the Bundestag. It then successfully entered a succession of regional parliaments between the two federal elections of 2013 and 2017. Only in Lower Saxony, Hesse and Bavaria did the AfD not enter parliament until after the 2017 election. The party's gradual entrance on the political scene has several methodological advantages. For one, this pattern of success means that we can test the effect of regional entrances on public opinion at a time when the party had not yet entered the federal parliament. Thus, any effects we observe on public opinion cannot be driven by the fact that the AfD was already represented on the federal level, which would be a serious confounder. At the same time, it is helpful that the AfD eventually entered all parliaments. Hence, cross-regional differences in public opinion are unlikely to drive the success of the AfD. This means that the case allows us to address a common potential source of reversed causation in the link between radical right success and voter attitudes.

Finally, looking at one country is useful as we can examine variation within one cultural and historic context. Moreover, the electoral system across German regions is almost identical

everywhere: a mixed-member electoral system with an electoral threshold of 5% of the vote.¹ Studying regional party entrance in Germany therefore also allows us to hold constant important institutional variables, specifically the electoral system and electoral thresholds.

3 Data

We test the legitimization effect of AfD entrance into parliament using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) from 2014 to 2017. The SOEP is an annual representative longitudinal panel study of roughly 13'000 German households and 30'000 respondents. Panel respondents have been surveyed since 1984.

The SOEP is representative at the federal and regional level and interviews respondents from January until November in each year. In Appendix [Figure C.1](#) we show the daily number of people interviewed for the four waves analyzed in our study.² While a quarter of all interviews take place within the first 100 days of a year, people are interviewed across the entire time span we study in each year. Importantly, interview dates are quasi-randomly assigned: the SOEP contacts people and sets up interview dates, which are plausibly exogenous to election timing and the entrances of the AfD. For the thirteen regional elections we study 74% ($N=85'982$) of all responses across all regions are conducted before and 26% ($N=30'262$) thereafter.

We focus on two sets of political questions contained in the SOEP. The first question asks respondents about their party identification. We recoded the variable as '1' if respondents identified with the AfD and '0' otherwise. The effect of achieving parliamentary representation may result in (1) persuasion, whereby people decide to identify as AfD supporters after the election and (2) decreased social desirability bias, whereby people decide to report their true identity more after electoral success. Both are legitimization effects. Party identification

¹Some variation exists: Bremen and Hamburg rely on proportional representation with open lists, while Saarland uses only proportional representation.

²The interview date allows us to match interview dates with the regional election dates, enabling us to determine whether a respondent was interviewed before or after a given regional election. Unlike many other surveys, the SOEP reports interview dates. No other panel dataset captures the 2013-2017 period as well as the SOEP; in the only alternative, the German Longitudinal Election Study, contains few waves between 2014 and 2016, and these usually fall outside of regional elections. Repeated cross-sections are not useful because these do not allow us to test for within-person changes. However, one drawback of the SOEP is that it does not include some traditional political variables, such as left-right position.

4 Model

is a rather conservative test of legitimization effects as it is remarkably stable across time (e.g. Inglehart and Klingemann 1976). Moreover, as a new party, AfD identity was not initially very strong: across the SOEP panel waves, only roughly 2% state that they hold an AfD party identity. Thus, if we find an effect of AfD entrances on party identification this would constitute strong evidence for a legitimization effect.

The second set of questions asks respondents how concerned they are about several issues. We focus on how worried respondents are about migration, the key topic the AfD campaigned on. An increase in concern about this issue therefore implies that people are persuaded by the AfD's agenda. We report results for all issues below. The response scale is 'very concerned', 'somewhat concerned', and 'not concerned at all'. The 'somewhat' category is used by most issues for most respondents. Hence, we only coded respondents as '1' if they suggested to be 'very concerned' about migration (17.9% of respondents).³

4 Model

We estimate the effect of the AfD's entry into regional parliaments on AfD party identification and the issue salience of migration. Our expectation is that party entrance positively impacts on both outcome variables, so that party identification and migration salience are higher in those regions where the party successfully entered parliament. To test this, we use panel data analysis and estimate the following model:

$$y_{i,r,t} = \alpha + \beta \text{AfD entry}_{r,t} + \iota_i + \rho_r + \tau_t + \epsilon_{i,r,t}$$

y is the dependent variable observed across years (t) and respondents (i); ι_i , ρ_r and τ_t are fixed effects for respondent $_i$, region $_r$ and month $_t$. AfD entry $_{r,t}$ is a binary indicator being '1' if the AfD is represented in a regional parliament and '0' otherwise. Thus, we model the effect of the eleven AfD entries ($\beta \text{AfD entry}_{r,t}$) by analyzing the change within respondents and controlling for region and time differences using ordinary least squares.⁴ Additionally, we also

³Results are similar if we treat responses as continuous.

⁴The outcome of both of our dependent variables is binary; using logistic regression results in the same conclusions. However, OLS is more efficient, and several of the fixed effects included in our analyses lead to a perfect prediction of the outcome and the exclusion of cases from the analyses using logistic regression.

report a model introducing a set of individual-level controls (gender, income, unemployment, age, education and political knowledge). Since we observe the same set of respondents across time we cluster our standard errors by individual. Although they live in different regions within Germany, it is likely that all respondents are subject to common time shocks (“contemporaneous dependence”). Thus, we use two-way clustering by respondents and month (Bechtel, Hangartner, and Schmid 2016: 758).⁵

In essence, our estimation approach generalizes the well-known difference-in-differences (DiD) approach. The key identification assumption to interpret our findings causally is that we observe parallel trends between treated (*respondents interviewed after the AfD entry*) and control (*respondents interviewed before the AfD entry*) units. This means that in the absence of the AfD entry the treated respondents would have followed the same trends as the control units. Since we can only observe each respondent maximally three times we cannot test this assumption by plotting parallel trends. Instead, in the appendix we report several tests of the plausibility of our estimates that amongst others show that respondents are not more likely to identify with the AfD or worry about migration prior to the entrances of the AfD (see Appendix [subsection B.1](#)).

5 Results

Descriptive statistics show that 1.1% of respondents identify with the AfD in regions where the party is not represented in the regional parliament. In contrast, 2.3% of respondents do so if the party is represented in the regional parliament. In terms of worrying about migration the descriptive findings are even more striking: 27.6% of respondents worry about migration if the AfD is not in the regional parliament, while 39.9% worry about migration if the AfD is represented there. A simple t-test is significant, providing first indicative evidence that there is a legitimization effect due to AfD entry.


Figure 1 goes beyond descriptive differences and reports the findings of the estimation strategy outlined above; the left panel reports the OLS findings for party identification with

⁵This results in only 44 clusters. Methodological research highlights that clustering on less than fifty clusters can lead to biased estimates. However, clustering only on the respondent level does not change the results we report below (see Appendix Table [Table C.8](#)).

5 Results

the AfD while the models in the right panel report findings for ‘worry about migration’ (for full results see [Appendix C](#)). In both sets of models we subsequently add different fixed effects – the first model does not including any fixed effects, the second adds individual fixed effects, the third regional fixed effects and the fourth time fixed effects. The final coefficient for each dependent variable then includes the individual-level controls discussed above.

Figure 1: OLS regression, effect of AfD entrances on ‘AfD identification’ & ‘worry about migration’



Note: +IFE = adds individual level fixed effects, +RFE = adds regional fixed effects, +MFE = adds monthly fixed effects, +controls = adds individual-level controls. Reported are OLS point estimates surrounded by 95% confidence intervals. Models cumulatively add fixed effects and controls. Full models reported in [Table C.2](#).

Our models confirm that the entrance of the AfD significantly increases the proportion of respondents identifying with the AfD and worrying about migration. Keeping in mind that only roughly 1.3% in the entire sample identify with the AfD, the findings for party identification with the AfD are particularly strong and in line with the simple descriptive evidence we outlined above. Our estimation suggests that after the AfD entered parliament the proportion of people identifying with the party increases by 1.3 percentage points. This reduces to around .5 percentage points once time fixed effects are introduced; this is still a substantively meaningful effect given the low base of around 1 percent. In further analyses, we find that AfD entry increases SPD and Green party identification along with AfD party identification, pointing to a polarization of identities (see [Appendix subsection B.2](#)). We also find that non-voters and Left party voters in 2013 were most likely to identify with the AfD after the party

entered parliament (see Appendix [Figure C.2](#)).⁶

The effect on migration is also strong in substantive terms (7.8 percentage points). Again, the point estimate decreases substantially once we introduce time fixed effects, to just 2 percentage points. This suggests that a lot of the variation can be predicted by changes across time (e.g. the 2015 refugee crisis). Yet, the findings remain significant across all models. Additional analyses show that all other worries decrease (see Appendix [subsection B.2](#)). We do not find an equivalent rise in worry about radical-right movements and xenophobia.

Two tests in the appendix underline the plausibility of our findings. First, placebo tests indicate no effect of AfD entry in earlier time periods (see Appendix [subsection B.1](#)). Second, we find some evidence of stronger effects in modes where no interviewer is present, though these differences are not statistically significant (Valentim 2019) (see Appendix [subsection B.3](#)).

6 Conclusion

We find a clear legitimization effect of radical-right party entry in regional parliaments on political attitudes. In regions where the AfD gained parliamentary representation, citizens are more likely to publicly declare their support for the party in surveys. They are also more likely to see migration, the AfD's key issue, as a core concern. Hence, using the unique case of the AfD's staggered arrival on the German political scene we find rigorous causal evidence that the public success of a radical competitor affects whom citizens support and why.

Several questions remain. Here, we look at party identification and issue salience, but one key consequence may be polarizing position-taking. There is evidence for this in other work (Bischof and Wagner 2019), but the SOEP panel does not allow us to test for such effects in Germany. We also find some evidence for a voter backlash, with citizens shocked by the AfD's success identifying more with opposing parties; but this question, too, needs further study. Finally, one open question concerns the long-term effects of radical party entry. Because Germany as a whole is now 'treated' since the last federal election, such effects can no longer clearly be identified. However, studying how the entrance of radical parties shapes political competition in the long term is a key task for future research.

⁶Note that the SOEP only records voting behavior in national parliamentary elections.

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A Overview: AfD parliamentary entrances

Below we report the state elections we analyze in our paper along with the election date and the vote share for the AfD.

Table A.1: Entrances of AfD into regional parliaments, 2013-2018

Region	Date	% votes	Included in analyses?
Sachsen	31.08.14	9.70	✓
Brandenburg	14.09.14	12.20	✓
Thüringen	14.09.14	10.60	✓
Hamburg	15.02.15	6.10	✓
Bremen	10.05.15	5.50	✓
Baden-Württemberg	13.03.16	15.10	✓
Rheinland-Pfalz	13.03.16	12.60	✓
Sachsen-Anhalt	13.03.16	24.30	✓
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	04.09.16	20.80	✓
Berlin	18.09.16	14.20	✓
Saarland	26.03.17	6.20	✓
Schleswig-Holstein	07.05.17	5.90	✓
Nordrhein-Westfalen	14.05.17	7.40	✓
Niedersachsen	15.10.17	6.20	
Bayern	01.10.18	10.20	
Hessen	28.10.18	13.10	

B Plausibility of estimates

To more carefully investigate the interpretation of our findings we conducted two key robustness tests.

B.1 Effect of placebo AfD entrances


A first concern that may prevent us from interpreting our findings causally is the question of violating the parallel trends assumption. As outlined above, we cannot test this assumption by directly looking into the parallel trends between respondents as we only observe each respondent three times at most. Instead, we use a placebo test to get at this question.

To do so we test whether respondents are significantly different on the two outcome variables we study one month prior to the entry of the AfD. If we found that respondents already diverged prior to the AfD's regional entry this would be evidence that the parallel trends assumption is violated.

Figure B.1 reports the findings of this test. It becomes strikingly clear that prior to AfD entrance we do not find a significant difference between respondents who experience its entry and those that do not

B Plausibility of estimates

Figure B.1: Placebo test: are respondents different on outcomes prior to entry of the AfD?



Note: Reported are the results of the same model specification discussed in the method section including a lead variable of the AfD entry event. Plotted are coefficients surrounded by the 99.9%, 99% and 95% confidence intervals. Full models reported in Table C.3.

experience it later on (coefficient ‘placebo: t+1’). This lends support to the idea that the differences we find after the entry of the AfD is indeed subject to the entrance of the AfD and not the manifestation of sample differences beforehand. While this placebo test works out very well for identifying with the AfD, the placebo test is not statistically different from the actual entry of the AfD for the ‘worry about migration’ variable. We interpret this as suggestive evidence that the identification strategy works, but remain cautious to not over interpret the findings we report for migration above.

B.2 Remaining party IDs & issue salience


A second set of robustness tests looks at the entire range of parties and of issue concerns.

Concerning party identification, it may be that the increase for identifying with the AfD is driven by a more common trend across regions to select out of mainstream party identities and into extreme party identities. To look into this argument we re-estimated model (4) in table C.2 on each party identity included in the SOEP. We report the findings in Figure B.2 as coefficient plots with 95% confidence intervals.

It becomes clear that such a pattern does not exist. Neither of the two major parties is subject to a major decrease of respondents identifying with the party. In fact the only sub-sample of respondents significantly decreasing is the category of independent voters (‘no id’). This finding is in line with suggestive evidence and exit polls results suggesting that the major group of people selecting into AfD support are in fact voters who previously did not vote. Interestingly, we also observe an increase of

B Plausibility of estimates

Figure B.2: AfD entry effects on entire set of party identification in the SOEP



Note: Reported are the results of the same model specification discussed in the method section with a different set of dependent variables reported as marker labels in the figure. Plotted are coefficients surrounded by the 95% confidence interval. Full models reported in Table C.4.

people supporting the SPD and an almost significant effect for the Greens, perhaps indicating a polarization of political identities due to radical party success. Hence, these effects are suggestive evidence for a backlash effect against the AfD.

Figure B.3: AfD entry effects on entire set of worries in SOEP



Note: Reported are the results of the same model specification discussed in the method section on a different set of dependent variables reported as marker labels in the figure. Plotted are coefficients surrounded by the 95% confidence interval. Full models reported in Table C.5.

We conducted the same analysis for the entire set of “worries” asked in the SOEP. Figure B.3 reports these findings, again relying on a coefficient plot. We find that other than migration no other issue concern gains significantly in importance after the AfD enters the regional parliament. The second issue

relevant for the AfD – crime – reports a positive coefficient, albeit not statistically significant. Interestingly, respondents do not worry more about xenophobia after the AfD entered a regional parliament. This further underlines the idea that the issue agenda of the public becomes more favorable for radical views after the entry of a radical party into parliament. Interestingly, the amount of people worrying about their own economic well being decreases. This provides support for the idea that radical-right parties primarily activate ‘cultural’ concerns and lead to a reduction in salience for economic matters. This finding also contradicts claims that radical-right parties activate feelings of being economically ‘left behind’. All remaining ‘worries’ do not change in significant ways.


B.3 Checking for social desirability bias

Finally, we leverage the fact that the SOEP reports interview mode for the surveys conducted. This might reveal some information about the legitimization effect. Voters may believe that specific radical positions or parties are not socially acceptable and thus should not be shared with others publicly without facing some sort of sanctioning (e.g. social exclusion). In our case, we expect there to be a perceived social norm against supporting the AfD. However, this norm might be lower if the party has been legitimized by entering the regional parliament. In essence this suggests a social desirability bias, with some persons not willing to reveal their true preferences (AfD support); this effect should be lower in self-administered surveys. Comparing interview modes with third persons present (e.g. interviewers) to other survey modes could thus show us if such a social desirability bias exists (Nederhof 1985; Kreuter, Presser, and Tourangeau 2008; Valentim 2019). Hence, we assume that respondents surveyed via more direct contact to other persons (e.g. with an interviewer) should be less likely to share their AfD party identity in the survey than respondents interviewed in an indirect fashion (e.g. no interviewer/written/online).

Figure B.4 splits our models by type of interview conducted and for the AfD and the remaining mainstream parties represented in the German Bundestag – Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), Social Democrats (SPD), Liberal (FDP), Green (GRU), Socialist (Linke). The pattern we observe in Figure B.4 is in line with our assumption. We find that respondents interviewed via without interviewer interaction are more likely to state an AfD identity after the entrance of the party into parliament than respondents interviewed with an interviewer present. Yet, this effect is small in size and not statistically significant and should therefore be read with caution. Interestingly, we observe no such effect for the remaining parties. This finding provides some further support for the idea that social desirability drives the AfD

B Plausibility of estimates

Figure B.4: AfD entry effects by type of interview conducted: identifying with the AfD



Note: Reported are the results of the same model specification discussed in the method section. Yet, on a different set of dependent variables reported as marker labels in the figure. Plotted are coefficients surrounded by the 95% confidence interval. Full models reported in Table C.6.

legitimization effect to some extent.

C Further Tables & Figures

Figure C.1: Number of interviews per 'day of the year' in the SOEP




Table C.2: OLS regression, effect of AfD entrances on 'AfD identification' & 'worry about migration'

	AfD party identification					worry about migration				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
AfD entry	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.08 (0.01)	0.10 (0.02)	0.10 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
controls	-----					-----				
individual FE		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
regional FE			✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓
month FE				✓	✓				✓	✓
R^2	0.00	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.53	0.00	0.58	0.58	0.61	0.62
$adj.R^2$	0.00	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.00	0.42	0.42	0.45	0.46
N	106'534	9'6604	9'6604	9'6602	8'8118	9'4897	9'4897	9'4897	9'4897	8'6515
$N_{(individuals)}$	37'430	27'500	27'500	27'499	25'916	27'028	27'028	27'028	27'028	25'450
$N_{cluster(pid \times month)}$	44	44	44	43	43	43	43	43	43	43

Standard errors in parentheses

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Table C.3: OLS regression, placebo effect of AfD entry on identification & worry about migration

	DV: AfD party identification		DV: worry about migration	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Placebo AfD _{t+1}	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
AfD entry	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.03
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Constant	0.01	0.33	0.01	0.33
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
individual FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
regional FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
month FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.56	0.65	0.56	0.65
$adj.R^2$	0.32	0.46	0.32	0.46
N	63'432	61'872	63'432	61'872
$N_{(individuals)}$	22'457	21'677	22'457	21'677
$N_{cluster(region*month)}$	34	34	34	34

Standard errors in parentheses

Table C.4: OLS regression, effect of AfD entrances on remaining party IDs

	DV: Party Identification						
	AfD	FDP	Union	SPD	GRU	Linke	No ID
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
AfD entry	0.01	0.00	-0.00	0.01	0.00	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Constant	0.01	0.01	0.16	0.12	0.06	0.03	0.58
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
individual FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
regional FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
month FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.52	0.69	0.78	0.74	0.76	0.72	0.72
$adj.R^2$	0.33	0.57	0.69	0.64	0.67	0.61	0.60
N	96'602	96'602	96'602	96'602	96'602	96'602	96'602
$N_{(individuals)}$	27'499	27'499	27'499	27'499	27'499	27'499	27'499
$N_{cluster(region*month)}$	43	43	43	43	43	43	43

Standard errors in parentheses

Table C.5: OLS regression, effect of AfD entrances on remaining 'worries'

	DV: 'Worries'								
	migration (1)	xenophobia (2)	economy (3)	general (4)	economy self (5)	work (6)	environment (7)	peace (8)	crime (8)
AfD entry	0.02 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.02 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Constant	0.34 (0.00)	0.35 (0.00)	0.15 (0.00)	0.17 (0.00)	0.06 (0.00)	0.28 (0.00)	0.49 (0.00)	0.39 (0.00)	0.39 (0.00)
individual FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
regional FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
month FE	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.61	0.55	0.53	0.60	0.51	0.59	0.57	0.61	0.61
$adj. R^2$	0.45	0.36	0.34	0.43	0.31	0.43	0.40	0.45	0.45
N	94'897	98'517	94'897	98'517	96'621	94'897	94'897	94'897	94'897
$N^{(individuals)}$	27'028	28'448	27'028	28'448	27'500	27'028	27'028	27'028	27'028
$N_{cluster(region*month)}$	43	43	43	43	43	43	43	43	43

Standard errors in parentheses


C Further Tables & Figures

Table C.6: OLS regression, differences of AfD entry effects across interview types

	Interviewer present		No interviewer present	
	AfD id	mainstream id	AfD id	mainstream id
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
AfD entry	0.00	0.00	0.01	-0.01
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Constant	0.01	0.32	0.02	0.44
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
regional FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
month FE	✓	✓	✓	✓
R^2	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.02
$adj.R^2$	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.02
N	77'248	84'266	29'066	29'083
$N_{(individuals)}$	29'421	35'490	10'296	10'296
$N_{cluster(region*month)}$	43	43	41	41

Standard errors in parentheses

Figure C.2: Marginal effects, differences of AfD entry effects across 2013 voting preferences



Note: Reported are the results of the first model in tables C.7 reported below as marginal effects. Plotted are coefficients surrounded by the 95% confidence interval.

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Table C.7: OLS regression, differences of AfD entry effects across 2013 voting preferences

	AfD party identification	
	(1)	(2)
AfD entry	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
SPD	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)
Union	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)
FDP	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)
Gru	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)
Linke	0.00 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)
AfD	0.27 (0.02)	0.26 (0.02)
Rechte	0.06 (0.02)	0.05 (0.02)
other	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
AfD entry × SPD	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
AfD entry × Union	-0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.00)
AfD entry × FDP	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
AfD entry × Gru	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
AfD entry × Linke	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
AfD entry × AfD	-0.04 (0.04)	-0.04 (0.04)
AfD entry × Rechte	0.06 (0.05)	0.06 (0.05)
AfD entry × other	-0.02 (0.01)	-0.02 (0.01)
female		-0.01 (0.00)
unemployed		0.00 (0.00)
political knowledge		0.01 (0.00)
age		0.00 (0.00)
age × age		-0.00 (0.00)
income quantiles		-0.00 (0.00)
no education		0.01 (0.01)
low education		0.01 (0.00)
middle education		0.00 (0.00)
high education		-0.00 (0.00)
Constant	0.01 (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)
regional FE	✓	✓
month FE	✓	✓
R^2	0.10	0.11
$adj. R^2$	0.10	0.11
N	70'342	67'498
$N_{(individuals)}$	20'440	20'106
$N_{cluster(region*month)}$	43	43

Standard errors in parentheses

Table C.8: OLS regression, effect of AfD entrances on 'AfD identification' & 'worry about migration' clustering on regional level

	AfD party identification				worry about migration					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
AfD entry	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.08 (0.03)	0.10 (0.02)	0.10 (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)
controls		✓	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓	✓
individual FE			✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓
regional FE			✓	✓	✓			✓	✓	✓
month FE				✓	✓				✓	✓
R^2	0.00	0.52	0.52	0.52	0.53	0.00	0.58	0.58	0.61	0.62
$adj.R^2$	0.00	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.00	0.42	0.42	0.45	0.46
N	106'534	96'604	96'604	96'602	88'118	103'684	94'897	94'897	94'897	86'515
$N_{cluster(individuals)}$	37'430	27'500	27'500	27'499	25'916	35'815	27'028	27'028	27'028	25'450
$N_{cluster(region \times month)}$	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16	16

Standard errors in parentheses